USENIX WOOT 2026 · systematization of knowledge

20 years of power, privilege & peril in x86 SMM

System Management Mode (SMM) runs beneath the OS and hypervisor with system-wide authority, which has long made it a target for attacks. This is the dataset from our SoK paper, made sortable and filterable, and updated as new work appears.

What is SMM? ring −2
ring 3 · apps ring 0 · kernel ring −1 · hypervisor SMM ring −2
SMM is more privileged than the kernel and hypervisor.

System Management Mode is a special x86 execution mode, present since the early 1990s, that operates outside the normal privilege hierarchy. It is often called “ring −2,” sitting below the OS kernel (ring 0) and the hypervisor (ring −1).

It is entered through a System Management Interrupt (SMI): the processor transparently suspends whatever was running, saves its state, and jumps to firmware-defined handler code executing from a protected memory region (SMRAM). An RSM instruction resumes the interrupted context. The whole transition is invisible to the OS and hypervisor.

SMM handles power management, thermal control, legacy device emulation, and security-critical firmware services (secure boot, authenticated variables, S3 resume). Because it has full hardware access and can preempt any context, it has been a target for stealthy rootkits and privilege-escalation attacks for over two decades.

  • Privilege ring −2, system-wide
  • Entry / exit SMI → handler → RSM
  • Runs from isolated SMRAM
  • Visible to OS? no

Full background in the SoK paper (§2, “Demystifying SMM”).

How entries are classified taxonomy

Every entry is labelled with the SoK's classification tree (paper Fig. 2), capturing where the weakness resides and what surface it exploits. Click any node below to filter the table by that category (click again to clear); selecting a parent matches everything beneath it.

Reading the indicator columns

  • Src: exploit code fully / partially / not available (repo links to an external repository)
  • E2E: a full / partial / no end-to-end exploit was demonstrated
  • Auto: automated tooling was / was not used to discover it

Three eras

  • Era 1 · 2006 to 2014: exploiting platform configuration
  • Era 2 · 2014 to 2020: breaking SMM code apart
  • Era 3 · 2020 to present: automated validation
Landscape by era counts

How the offensive works split across the three eras — by classification category and by whether automated tooling was used to find them. Counts are computed live from the dataset.

How to cite BibTeX

If this index or the systematization behind it helps your work, please cite the SoK paper:

You can also reference the artifact and dataset through its Zenodo DOI.

0 entries
Offensive SMM research, sortable and filterable

Keep it current

Found a new attack, tool, or advisory? Entries live in a single data.json file — the site's sole source of truth. Add an object to its entries array (copy a nearby one and adjust), then commit. The classification chips and filters update themselves from the taxonomy you tag it with.